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Abstract
One  of  the  most  intriguing  –  and  arguably  counter-intuitive  – 
doctrines defended by environmental philosophers is that of positive 
aesthetics, the thesis that all of nature is beautiful. The doctrine has 
attained  philosophical  respectability  only  comparatively  recently, 
thanks  in  no  small  part  to  the  work  of  Allen  Carlson,  one  of  its 
foremost defenders. In this paper we argue that the doctrine can be 
found much earlier  in  the work of  Gottfried  Wilhelm Leibniz  who 
devised  and  defended  a  version  of  positive  aesthetics  (avant  la 
lettre) in the early modern period, grounded in a conception of the 
world as a world of monads, each of which individually fulfils the 
rationalist  aesthetic  criteria  of  multiplicity-in-unity  and that  taken 
together ensure that the world as a whole is a harmoniously ordered 
system of multiple and diverse individuals, whose intelligible order 
and  variety  is  made  known  to  us  through  natural  scientific 
endeavour.  In showing this,  we advance two further theses: first, 
that  Leibniz’s  version  of  positive  aesthetics  displays  more 
philosophical virtue than Carlson’s, for whereas Carlson’s doctrine is 
vague  and  admits  of  exceptions,  Leibniz’s  is  clear  and  all-
encompassing.  And  secondly,  that  Leibniz’s  version  of  positive 
aesthetics has the resources to overcome a difficulty inherent in the 
exclusively science-based justification that Carlson offers.
2Introduction
One  of  the  most  intriguing  –  and  arguably  counter-intuitive  – 
doctrines defended by environmental philosophers is that of positive 
aesthetics, the thesis that all of nature is beautiful. A perusal of the 
literature on the topic  would lead one to suppose that while  the 
belief  that  all  nature  is  beautiful  has  been held  by  a  number  of 
artists and naturalists over the last two centuries,1 it has attained 
philosophical  respectability only  comparatively recently,  thanks in 
no  small  part  to  the  work  of  Allen  Carlson,  one  of  its  foremost 
defenders.  In  this  paper  we  shall  show  that  such  a  picture  is 
inadequate,  inasmuch  as  it  says  nothing  about  the  thought  of 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who devised and defended a version of 
positive  aesthetics  (avant  la  lettre)  in  the  early  modern  period, 
grounded in a conception of the world as a world of monads, each of 
which  individually  fulfils  the  rationalist  aesthetic  criteria  of 
multiplicity-in-unity and that taken together ensure that the world as 
a whole is a harmoniously ordered system of multiple and diverse 
individuals, whose intelligible order and variety is made known to us 
through natural scientific endeavour. In showing this, we advance 
two further theses: first, that Leibniz’s version of positive aesthetics 
displays  more  philosophical  virtue  than  Carlson’s,  for  whereas 
Carlson’s doctrine is vague and admits of exceptions, Leibniz’s is 
clear and all-encompassing.  And second, that Leibniz’s version of 
positive  aesthetics  has  the  resources  to  overcome  the  difficulty 
inherent  in  the  science-based  justification  that  Carlson  offers.  To 
show  this,  we  shall  first  outline  Carlson’s  doctrine  of  positive 
aesthetics, and then turn our attention to Leibniz.
Carlson’s Positive Aesthetics
In  Aesthetics and the Environment,  Allen Carlson defines positive 
aesthetics  as  the  ‘initially  implausible’  view  that  ‘all  the  natural 
world is beautiful’ and that ‘the natural environment, insofar as it is 
1 See Carlson 2000: 73-4 for examples. 
3untouched  by  humans,  has  mainly  positive  aesthetic  qualities’ 
(Carlson 2000: 72).2 We might wonder – as indeed have others, such 
as Malcolm Budd – whether Carlson is here thinking of nature as 
whole,  or  the biosphere,  ecosystems,  species,  individual  (natural) 
things, or individual (natural) events.3 While Carlson doesn’t specify, 
the way in which he seeks to justify positive aesthetics affords us a 
clue. He argues that in our appreciation of nature, we should adopt 
what he calls the ‘natural environment model’, according to which 
‘we must appreciate nature… in light of knowledge provided by the 
natural  sciences,  especially  the  environmental  sciences  such  as 
geology, biology and ecology’ (Carlson 2000: 6). More specifically, 
we should appreciate natural things under their correct categories, 
which are the categories that are discovered by naturalists. So for 
example, if we are appreciating a whale, we should do so under the 
category of ‘mammal’ rather than ‘fish’ or ‘bird’ or ‘marsupial’ etc. 
(Carlson 2000:  63ff).  This  enables  us  to  appreciate  it  as  what  it 
actually  is,  which  in  turn  enables  us  to  have  a  richer,  deeper 
appreciation of that thing. Unfortunately Carlson’s insistence on our 
appreciating natural things under their correct categories does not 
2 Originally published as Carlson 1984. As we shall see over the course of this 
paper, Leibniz’s belief that the whole of nature is beautiful differs in various ways 
from the position that Carlson adopts. But one difference is worth noting now, 
which is this: Leibniz makes a distinction between the living machines of nature 
created by God and the artificial machines constructed by humans. The former 
have infinitely many enfolded parts; the latter have only a finite number of parts 
(New System: GP IV 482; L 456).  The organic bodies of human beings are living 
machines and as such are just as much a part of nature as any other living body.  
Therefore  to  consider  nature  as  beautiful  only  ‘insofar  as  it  is  untouched  by 
humans’ is to separate the natural from the human in a way that Leibniz would 
not endorse.  
3 See  Budd  2002:  97.  Needless  to  say,  there  is  a  rich  literature  on  positive 
aesthetics, and in it one can find various other objections to the doctrine, or at 
any rate to versions thereof. It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a detailed 
examination of this literature, and the objections found therein, and we thus leave 
it to the reader to assess how well Leibniz’s version of positive aesthetics fares 
against objections found (for example) in Fisher 2001: 271-3 and Brady 2010. It 
should be noted, however, that many objections to positive aesthetics are aimed 
at one specific version of the doctrine. For example, the objection that it is highly 
implausible to suppose that all parts and elements of nature are equally beautiful 
(articulated for example in Budd 2002: 127, and Fisher 2001: 272) has force only 
against versions of positive aesthetics that make such a claim.
4enable us to determine precisely what he means when he talks of all 
nature having only positive aesthetic qualities, though it does allow 
us  to  make  an  educated  guess.  Certainly  Carlson’s  choice  of 
illustration for the doctrine (individual whales) suggests he thinks it 
applies  to  individual  natural  things  (e.g.  individual  whales). 
However,  we  should  here  note  Carlson’s  concession  that  some 
natural  things  are  not aesthetically  good.  When  faced  with  the 
objection that ‘grossly malformed living things will remain grotesque 
no matter how comprehensible science renders their malformation’ 
(Budd 2002: 102, cf. 126), Carlson conceded that grossly malformed 
living  things are  exceptions  to  his  view  on  positive  aesthetics 
(Carlson  2002:  234n36).  In  another  text,  he  admitted  that 
‘damaged, diseased, and malformed living things’ are all exceptions 
(Parsons & Carlson 2008: 136).4 Clearly, then, Carlson sees positive 
aesthetics  applying to  individual  natural  things,  but  not  to  all  of 
them, and not in all of their states. We might reasonably suppose 
that he would take it to apply to individual natural events as well, 
but it is less clear that he would also apply it to nature as whole, the 
biosphere,  ecosystems,  or  species,  given  that  these  do  not, 
according to conventional wisdom, fall under the senses because of 
their vastness or abstractness. But there is an element of conjecture 
here,  because  ultimately  Carlson  leaves  the  parameters  of  his 
version of positive aesthetics rather vague.
In any case, even if Carlson is unclear about what exactly falls 
under his version of positive aesthetics, he is clear about how it is 
to be grounded, insisting that scientific study of the natural world 
is  the  most  effective  route  to  the  discovery  of the  positive 
aesthetic qualities that nature possesses in itself: 
4 In this book, the authors advance an aesthetics of nature that emphasises the 
functional  values  that  individuals  possess  in  relation  to  each  other  and  their 
environments. Although Leibniz’s metaphysical views are highly relevant to this 
approach, it would take us too far from the topic of this paper to explore them 
here.
5When  nature  is  aesthetically  appreciated  in  virtue  of  the 
natural  and  environmental  sciences,  positive  aesthetic 
appreciation is singularly appropriate, for,  on the one hand, 
pristine nature – nature in its natural state – is an aesthetic 
ideal  and, on the other,  as science increasingly finds,  or at 
least  appears  to  find,  unity,  order,  and harmony in  nature, 
nature  itself,  when  appreciated in  light  of  such knowledge, 
appears more fully beautiful. (Carlson 2000: 12)
Insofar as scientific investigation of nature uncovers the aesthetic 
qualities that the natural world possesses in itself, it also serves as 
justification  of  a  positive  aesthetics  of  nature.  The  aim  of  the 
sciences is the intelligible explanation of  phenomena. And in this 
endeavour the natural sciences seek to explain natural phenomena 
in  terms of  ‘order,  harmony,  balance,  tension,  resolution,  and so 
forth’ (Carlson 2000: 93). These, as Carlson explains, are precisely 
the qualities that we find aesthetically pleasing: 
these qualities that make the world seem comprehensible to 
us are also those that we find aesthetically good. Thus, when 
we experience them in the natural  world or experience the 
natural world in terms of them, we find it aesthetically good. 
This is not surprising, for qualities such as order, regularity, 
harmony,  balance,  tension,  and  resolution  are  the  kinds  of 
qualities that we find aesthetically good in art. (Carlson 2000: 
93)
Carlson does not speculate as to why it is that the criteria we apply 
in the sciences are the same criteria against which we judge the 
aesthetic qualities of works of art (ibid.). However, what is important 
in  respect of  a positive aesthetics  of  nature is  that  the scientific 
criteria lead to the discovery of truths about the natural world. It is 
6not just that scientific studies are guided by the desire to make the 
natural world intelligible to us in terms of order, harmony, balance 
and the like, but also that in doing so, science discovers that the 
natural  world  is  a  world  in  which  these  aesthetically  appealing 
qualities really are present. The natural sciences, he contends, do 
not  impose these qualities  on the environment.  Rather,  scientific 
investigation brings to light what is already there. In this way, the 
sciences reveal that nature itself is aesthetically good. In Carlson’s 
own words, 
these  categories  not  only  make  the  natural  world  appear 
aesthetically  good,  but  in  virtue of  being correct  determine 
that it is aesthetically good (Carlson 2000: 94). 
The  more  that  the  sciences  succeed  in  making  intelligible  the 
natural world as a world that is ordered, regular, harmonious and 
balanced, the more that world is found to be not only intelligible, but 
also  aesthetically  pleasing:  ‘the  development  of  science  and  its 
continual  self-revision  …  constitutes  a  movement  that  puts  the 
natural world in an increasingly favorable aesthetic light’ (Carlson 
2000: 94-95). 
Furthermore,  Carlson  argues  that  the  sciences  provide  the  only 
viable justification for positive aesthetics. Of particular relevance to 
our purposes here is Carlson’s rejection of theological justification as 
unsatisfactory.  As  Carlson  sees  it,  a  theological  justification  for 
positive aesthetics would be founded upon the belief that, having 
been designed and created by a perfect God, the world too would be 
perfect  and,  as such,  all  its  aesthetic  qualities  would  be positive 
qualities. While Carlson acknowledges that such an appeal to divine 
perfection would appear to justify the doctrine of positive aesthetics, 
he  goes  on to  identify  three ‘puzzles’  connected with  it  (Carlson 
2000: 82). First, insofar as the justification is unavailable to atheists, 
7it suggests, although it does not necessitate, the somewhat counter-
intuitive  notion  that  atheists  and  theists  appreciate  nature  in 
radically  different  ways.  Second,  traditional  appeals  to  the 
perfection  of  the  world  give  rise  to  the  ‘problem of  evil’,  which 
theists usually tackle not by denying the existence of evil, but by 
constructing a theodicy that seeks to explain why God would permit 
evil to exist in the world. Yet in the analogous ‘problem of ugliness’, 
which would aim to reconcile God’s existence with that of ugliness in 
the  natural  world,  theists  seeking  to  justify  positive  aesthetics 
through theology would be offering a decidedly non-analogous kind 
of solution, in that they would be simply denying the existence of 
ugliness,  rather  than  attempting  to  create  an  aesthetic  theodicy. 
Carlson  considers  this  incongruous,  arguing  that  the  tradition  of 
developing theodicies to tackle the problem of evil suggests that the 
theist  should  develop  an  aesthetic  theodicy  for  the  problem  of 
ugliness rather than just denying the existence of ugliness.5 Third, 
and finally, Carlson points to the paucity of historical evidence of 
Christian  thought  promoting  the  appreciation  of  nature.  On  the 
contrary, he insists, Christianity has ‘traditionally viewed wild nature 
as something to be confronted,  dominated,  and domesticated by 
human beings for their purposes’ (Carlson 2000: 83) and that, at 
least  in  the  West,  ‘Christianity  and  the  aesthetic  appreciation  of 
nature have been opposing forces to an extent that the latter could 
grow only as the former went into decline’ (Carlson 2000: 84).
In our view, Carlson’s concerns about the theological justification of 
positive aesthetic are not warranted. For instance, his first point – 
that  the  theological  justification  implies  that  theists  and  atheists 
appreciate nature differently – is not necessarily problematic. The 
difference could simply be acknowledged and accepted or absorbed 
within  a  wider  conception  of  the  role  of  theistic  and  atheistic 
5 Although he does not put it quite like this, Carlson’s point seems to be that 
analogous problems should admit of analogous solutions.
8appreciations of nature.6 Regarding the second objection, Carlson’s 
suggestion that because theists have engaged in theodicy to resolve 
the  problem  of  evil  they  should  likewise  engage  in  aesthetic 
theodicy  to  resolve  the  problem  of  ugliness  (rather  than  simply 
denying ugliness), is clearly under-motivated. There is no compelling 
reason why the two problems cannot be resolved in different ways. 
But if one insists that they have to be, one need only look at the 
work  of  Leibniz  to  see  how  both  problems  can  be  resolved  in 
analogous ways. For Leibniz acknowledged evil  in the parts while 
insisting that such evil is a necessary feature of a perfect whole and 
disappears in relation to it;7 similarly he proposes (as we shall see) 
that  negative  aesthetic  qualities  in  nature  are  either  merely 
apparent  or  real  only  when  the  individual  parts  of  nature  are 
considered  in  isolation  from  the  whole.  Leibniz  thus  offers  a 
traditional  theodicy,  and  a  cognate  aesthetic  theodicy.  Finally,  to 
Carlson’s  third  objection,  the  historical  fact  of  Christianity’s 
appalling  track  record  is  not  in  dispute:  for  centuries,  the  basic 
thrust of Christianity has been disadvantageous to the non-human 
world. However, historical record is not particularly relevant to the 
question whether it is possible to justify positive aesthetics of nature 
on  theological  grounds.  The  fact  that  Christians  have  historically 
failed to acknowledge the goodness and beauty of the natural world 
is not a declaration of the inevitability of Christian antipathy towards 
nature. The future need not always resemble the past. In any case, 
it is far from clear that the failure is as great as Carlson makes it out 
to  be:  the  historical  record  affords  us  numerous  examples  of 
Christian  thinkers  who  have  readily  made  positive  aesthetic 
judgements about nature, such as Thomas Burnet, John Ray, and 
6 The conclusions  to  be  drawn later  in  this  paper  would  support  this  second 
suggestion. 
7 See  for  example,  Leibniz’s  Remarks  on  the  three  volumes  entitled 
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, … 1711: GP III 429; L 633. See 
also On the Ultimate Origination of Things: GP VII 306-308; AG 153-154.
9George  Berkeley.8 And  today,  positive,  nature-affirming 
interpretations of Scripture are available as part of a contemporary 
theological drive towards a re-evaluation of the relation of God and 
world. Irrespective of how we view the historical record, in recent 
times,  writings  such  as  those  of  prominent  theologian  Jürgen 
Moltmann  stand  testimony  to  the  power  of  Christian  thought  to 
support  human appreciation  and  concern  for  Creation  (Moltmann 
1985). 
All the same, even if  the objections to the theological defence of 
positive  aesthetics  obtain  and  theological  appeals  to  God’s 
perfection and creativity are found insufficient to ground a positive 
aesthetics  of  nature,  this  does  not  mean  that  theological 
considerations should be rejected tout court,  for, as will be argued 
below, they do have important justificatory value.
We  begin  however,  with  a  defence  of  a  positive  aesthetics 
interpretation  of  Leibniz’s  account  of  the  beauty  of  the  natural 
world, before going on to explore the role of the natural sciences in 
bringing the objective beauty of nature into view. We will find that 
the natural sciences, while a necessary staging-post, are incapable 
of  providing a full  justification of  positive aesthetics.  We will  also 
discover  that,  for  Leibniz,  not  only  do  the  sciences  themselves 
require  theological  grounding,  but  also  that  a  theological 
justification of natural beauty uncovers a world the extent of whose 
beauty is  even greater  than that  which the natural  sciences can 
reveal. In conclusion it will be suggested that the most solid defence 
of  positive  aesthetics  lies  in  the  combination  of  a  scientific 
justification  underpinned  and  extended  by  a  rationalist  theology. 
8 See Burnet 1684: 109; Ray 1691: 150ff; Berkeley 2008: 192. And Leibniz is of 
course another who makes positive aesthetic judgements about nature, as we 
shall show.
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Only when the sciences and theology work together does positive 
aesthetics come to rest on a sure foundation.
The positive aesthetics of Leibniz
Following Ernst Cassirer (Cassirer 2009 [1951]: 34), recent accounts 
of eighteenth-century rationalist aesthetics have acknowledged the 
undoubted  immense  debt  to  Leibniz  owed  by  his  immediate 
successors, Christian Wolff and Alexander Baumgarten. For instance, 
Frederick Beiser (Beiser 2009) and Paul Guyer (Guyer 2014: 49-52) 
have drawn our attention to the influence of Leibniz’s thought on 
the eighteenth century rational aesthetics that stem from Wolff and 
Baumgarten.  The  genealogy  is  instructive  and  persuasive.  As 
Beiser’s penetrating and lucid account shows, Leibniz’s Principle of 
Sufficient Reason provided the basis for an aesthetics that maintains 
that the predication of beauty must be grounded upon intelligible 
principles of harmony, order and perfection, understood in terms of 
‘unity–in-variety’ (Beiser 2009: 4-8). Nevertheless, there are dangers 
and pitfalls that must be avoided when we read Leibniz backwards 
through the prism of the tradition of rationalist aesthetics that his 
thought inspired. The aesthetics of Wolff and Baumgarten combine 
both  subjective  and  objective  elements.  For  Wolff,  beauty  is 
subjective insofar as it exists as a feeling of pleasure: if there is no 
feeling of pleasure, there is no beauty. But insofar as this feeling of 
pleasure is a response to an actual perfection in the object itself, 
beauty is also objective. The subjective and objective elements are 
combined,  Beiser  holds,  in  Wolff’s  definition  of  beauty  as  the 
‘observability of perfection’: the definition ‘neatly joins both these 
elements together, for it means that beauty is neither perfection nor 
pleasure alone but both: the pleasure from observing perfection.’ 
(Beiser  2009:  63).  On  Beiser’s  reading,  Baumgarten  adopts  the 
same stance: beauty is objective insofar as it  is  grounded in the 
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actual perfection of the object and it is subjective insofar as beauty 
must be sensed and cognized.9
Following  Wolff,  Baumgarten’s  central  thesis  is  that  beauty 
consists  in  the  intuition  of  perfection.  …  Such  a  thesis 
attempts to explain both the subjective and objective aspects 
of beauty. In making perfection essential to beauty, it makes 
beauty partially objective. If there were no variety-in-unity in 
the object, there would be no beauty. But in making intuition 
also crucial to beauty, it also makes beauty subjective. If there 
were no sensible perception of perfection, there also would be 
no beauty. (Beiser 2009: 145)
Looking back to Leibniz from the perspective offered by Wolff and 
Baumgarten,  it  is  natural  to  read  Leibniz  in  the  same  way. 
Accordingly,  Beiser  states  that  for  Leibniz,  ‘beauty  is  both  a 
subjective and objective quality’ (Beiser 2009: 36). As evidence, he 
cites  Leibniz’s  well-known  definition  of  beauty  as  ‘that,  the 
contemplation of which is pleasant’ (Elements of Natural Law: A VI i 
464:  L  137).  On  Beiser’s  reading,  ‘contemplation’  introduces  a 
subjective element into Leibniz’s account of beauty that is additional 
to the objective element already present insofar as Leibniz regards 
pleasure  as  a  feeling  that  arises  when  perfections  that  exist 
objectively in the things are perceived (Beiser 2009: 35).
However, when we read Leibniz on his own terms, freed from the 
legacy  of  Wolff  and  Baumgarten’s  interpretations,  the  case  for 
reading Leibniz’s definition as indicative of the subjectivity of beauty 
is  significantly  weakened.  Reading  Leibniz  not  through  his 
enlightenment reception, but rather through the lens of his classical 
heritage brings Leibniz’s opinion that beauty is an objective quality 
9 For Baumgarten, aesthetics is the ‘science of sensitive  cognition’ (Aesthetics, 
§1). See Beiser 2009: 119. 
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into sharper focus.  The general consensus prior to the eighteenth 
century was that the objective beauty of things was found in the 
unified order and proportion of their parts,10 and therefore does not 
depend upon its also being subjectively perceived. Under this light, 
Leibniz’s claim that it is pleasing to contemplate beautiful things no 
more  suggests  that  things  are  beautiful  only  when  we  actually 
contemplate them than it suggests that the pleasure we get from 
contemplating or discovering scientific truths suggests that they are 
true  only  when  we  are  actually  contemplating  them.  When 
introducing his definition of beauty as ‘that, the contemplation of 
which is pleasant’, he prefaced his remark with the observation that 
‘We seek beautiful things because they are pleasant’ (Elements of 
Natural Law: A VI i 464: L 137). This strongly suggests that beauty 
exists independently of our perception or contemplation of it and 
that  the  contemplation  of  beautiful  things  is  pleasing  to  us  in 
consequence of their beauty, not a requisite for their beauty. They 
would be beautiful even were there no one to contemplate them. 
The same is  true  of  God’s  perception.  God knows the  beauty of 
things, but they are beautiful in themselves, not beautiful because 
God knows them.11 
Other of Leibniz’s remarks on the beauty of things confirm what is 
here implied, namely that beauty is wholly objective, and not reliant 
in  any  way  on  subjective  perception  or  contemplation.12 For 
example, in a piece on true piety and the love of God, Leibniz writes 
that  ‘we  consider  a  painting  excellent  not  because  of  some 
usefulness to us, but because of  its own beauty’ (The elements of 
10 Augustine, for instance, endorsed the by then popular Aristotelian view that 
conceives  beauty  in  terms  of  the  orderly  arrangement  of  parts.  See  Aristotle 
Poetics 1450a36-37: Barnes 1984: II 2322; Augustine, De ordine II.15.42: Borruso 
2007: 105-107.
11 See for example Rationale Fidei Catholicae, A VI iv, 2320; LGR 76-7. 
12 Obviously, of course, subjective perception or contemplation is still necessary 
if this objective beauty is to be perceived and appreciated. 
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true piety, or, on the love of God over everything: A VI iv 1357: SLT 
189, my emphasis), while shortly after in the same piece he repeats 
his  observation  that  ‘The  beautiful is  that,  the  contemplation  of 
which is pleasant’ (A VI iv 1358: SLT 190). Were this remark to be 
read  as  laying  claim  to  the  subjectivity  of  beauty,  it  would 
undermine  Leibniz’s  earlier  comment  in  the  same  piece  on  the 
objective beauty of the painting. Leibniz also holds that God Himself 
is beautiful – ‘nothing is happier than God and also nothing can be 
understood as being more beautiful or more worthy of happiness’ 
(Preface to the  Diplomatic Code of People’s Rights: GP III 387: SLT 
150).  God’s  beauty  depends  neither  on  our,  nor  on  God’s, 
contemplation of it. Finally, we may note that it is not only individual 
created things and God that are objectively beautiful. Leibniz asserts 
that the world as a whole has an objective beauty that, far from 
being even in part subjectively dependent upon our contemplation 
or pleasure, already exists, ready for us to discover provided we pay 
sufficient attention informed by the truths of mathematics: 
we must acknowledge that it is important that one have some 
general insights on mathematics, not as craftsmen have for 
the accuracy of their works, but because of the openings that 
one  finds  in  it  for  elevating  the  mind  to  thoughts  that  are 
beautiful  and sound in equal measure.  For without that the 
items of  human knowledge  are  only  vague  and  superficial. 
This is clearly seen with regard to the system of the visible 
universe,  about  which  the  previous  century  and  ours  have 
made wonderful discoveries, and what the ancients knew of it 
was mere juvenilia compared to what is known about it now. 
This system or structure of the visible world is of an admirable 
beauty which gives true ideas of the grandeur and harmony of 
the universe …
(Leibniz to Sophie, 23 October/2 November 1691: A I vii 49-50: 
LTS 91-92)
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Passages such as these portray Leibniz as an early exponent of a 
positive aesthetic of nature. First, he assumes that beautiful things 
are objectively beautiful. Their beauty does not depend upon being 
felt  or  contemplated.  Beauty  is  a  feature  of  things  themselves, 
discoverable  through  close  attention  to  the  empirical  detail, 
grounded  in  the  cognitive  truths  of  the  mathematical  sciences. 
Second,  as  we  see  from  the  passage  just  cited  from  Leibniz’s 
correspondence  with  Sophie,  Leibniz  also  views  nature  or  the 
universe in a wholly positive light. Other passages are even more 
explicit about this; for example, Leibniz informs us that ‘God created 
everything  in  accordance  with  the  greatest  harmony  or  beauty 
possible’  (Aphorisms  concerning  happiness,  wisdom,  charity  and 
justice:  A  VI  iv  2799;  LGR 138).  Thus,  in  anticipation  of  rational 
aesthetics  in  the  eighteenth  century  and  Carlson’s  adoption  of 
similar criteria for aesthetic goodness in our own, Leibniz held that 
the true perfection and beauty of the universe resides in its being a 
harmoniously  ordered  and  infinitely  varied  plurality  of  individual 
living substances. Any ugly disorder we believe to occur in nature is 
more apparent than real. When we see such negative qualities in 
the context of the whole, the disorder vanishes: 
the apparent disorders are only like certain chords in music 
which sound bad when one hears them by themselves, but 
which  a  skillful  composer  leaves  in  his  work  because  by 
combining  them  with  other  chords  they  increase  one’s 
enjoyment, and render the whole harmony more beautiful. 
(Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte, 9/19 May 1697: GP VII 545: LTS 
160)
Elsewhere, Leibniz explains that ‘all the imperfections we think we 
find in the world only originate from our ignorance’ and that we lack 
‘the right point of view to judge of the beauty of things’ (to André 
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Morell, 29 September 1698: A I xvi 162: SLT 197). We have relatively 
distinct  perceptions  of  only  a  tiny  fragment  of  this  spatially  and 
temporally  infinite  plenum of  a  universe.  For  the  most  part,  our 
perceptions are confused: we do not clearly perceive the parts of an 
object,  or  of  the  universe,  and  so  fail  to  appreciate  fully  and 
intellectually the perfect harmonious order of the whole. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that we fail to appreciate its beauty in all its 
finest glory (Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte, 9/19 May 1697: GP VII 545: 
LTS 160). Nevertheless, even when our perceptions are confused, 
we may still have a sense that ‘There is something, I know not what, 
that pleases me in the matter’, and this sense testifies to the fact 
that at the level of ‘our feelings [Gemüth]’ we have registered or 
perceived the presence of intrinsic, objective perfection and beauty 
(On Wisdom: GP VII 86: L 425-426).
 Leibniz and the sciences
One  might  with  reason  expect  Leibniz  to  justify  his  positive 
aesthetics  theologically  by  simply  appealing  directly  to  God’s 
goodness and perfection. After all, Leibniz does maintain that God 
freely  chose  to  create  this  world  rather  than  any  other  world 
because this world is the best of all possible worlds. Obviously, an 
omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent God, wisely guided by the 
principle of  the best,  will  choose to create that world that is  the 
most harmonious, most ordered, good and beautiful, in short, the 
world that is the most perfect. 13
Surprisingly, however, Leibniz does not, at least in the first instance, 
justify the positive beauty and perfection of the world by appealing 
to God’s perfection.  On the contrary,  we find him arguing in  the 
13 See Theodicy §416: G VI 364, where Leibniz envisions possible worlds being 
ranked in terms of beauty, and God choosing the most beautiful one, namely ours, 
the best of all possible worlds. 
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opposite direction: the beauty and perfection that we find in the 
world leads us to knowledge of God. Leibniz declares that there are 
in  fact  two  ways  that  lead  to  knowledge  of  God’s  beauty  and 
perfections ‘through his emanations’: 
namely  in  the  knowledge  of  eternal  truths,  explaining  the 
reasons in themselves, and in the knowledge of the harmony 
of the universe, by applying reasons to facts. That is to say, 
we  must  know the  wonders  of  reason  and  the  wonders  of 
nature. (Happiness: Gr 580-81; SLT 168)
The ‘wonders of reason and of eternal truths’ concern the truths of 
arithmetic, geometry, justice and morals that the mind ‘discovers in 
itself  in  the  sciences  of  reasoning’.  However,  the  ‘wonders  of 
corporeal  nature’,  which include ‘the system of  the universe,  the 
structure of the bodies of animals, the causes of the rainbow, of the 
magnet, of tidal ebb and flow, and a thousand other similar things’ 
(Happiness:  Gr 581;  SLT 168),  had been discovered only  through 
natural  scientific  application  of  ‘reasons  to  facts’.  It  was  this 
methodology that had led to Nicolas Copernicus’ revolutionising of 
our understanding of the heavens, Johannes Kepler’s discovery of 
the elliptical paths of the planets and realisation of the role played 
by the moon in the turning of the tides, the painstaking uncovering 
of  minute  worlds  by  microscopists  such  as  Antonie  van 
Leeuwenhoek, William Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the 
blood, Descartes’ and Newton’s studies of the rainbow, and William 
Gilbert’s theory of magnetism. 
Although he does not coin the phrase, in Leibniz’s acknowledgment 
of the value of the applied natural sciences in bringing to light the 
‘wonders of nature’, we see him moving towards a justification of 
positive aesthetics that bears a remarkable affinity to Carlson’s own 
justification by the natural sciences. From mathematical physics and 
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astronomy  to  chemistry,  anatomy,  and  physiology,  the  natural 
sciences  were  transforming  early  modern  understanding  of  the 
natural world and humans’ place within it. But more than this, they 
were discovering order, variety and harmony throughout all parts of 
the universe. And the more they discovered, the more the beauty of 
the universe came to light. In the words of Leibniz:
It is only in our time that we are beginning to recognize the 
secret of both the little and the great world, by the discovery, 
on the one hand, of the circulation of the blood in ourselves, 
and on the other hand (by means of telescopes) of the true 
movements of the heavenly bodies. If human beings continue 
to make progress as they have within the past hundred years, 
many things of wonderful beauty will be displayed by nature 
… 
(Thoughts on Van Helmont’s doctrines, first half of October (?) 
1696: A I xiii, 51; LTS 139)
Leibniz’s stance is clearly in the spirit of Carlson’s natural scientific 
defence  of  positive  aesthetics.  There  are  differences  in  their 
respective  conceptions  of  the  natural  sciences:  Leibniz’s 
mathematically informed approach stands in contrast to the natural 
historical  approach  favoured  by  Carlson  in  which  classification 
according to natural categories dominates.14 Nevertheless, whatever 
the  actual  methodology  employed,  both  Leibniz  and  Carlson  are 
convinced that natural scientific investigation is the means by which 
14 We thank an anonymous referee for this point. We thank another anonymous 
referee  for  pointing  out  that  there  is  a  degree  of  subjectivity  inherent  in  the 
human categorization of nature that creates a certain tension with the idea of 
objective beauty grounded in these categories.  The idea is that the categories we 
employ in our understanding of nature are to some extent nominal or arbitrary. 
Carlson himself, however, considers the categories of nature as objectively true 
natural kinds, discovered rather than created by natural sciences (Carlson 2000: 
90). The issue does not arise for Leibniz, for he locates the beauty of nature not in 
categories or species, but in its unique individual constituents that together form 
a similarly unique and beautiful whole. 
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objective  natural  beauty,  as  intelligible  order  and  harmony,  is 
discovered and appreciated. 
Leibniz  himself,  however,  goes  beyond  this  to  claim  that  those 
‘many things of wonderful beauty’ that we find in nature, ‘give us 
yet more cause to esteem their creator, and to take pleasure in his 
acts’ (Thoughts on Van Helmont’s doctrines, first half of October(?) 
1696: A I xiii, 51; LTS 139). The discovery of beauty in nature leads 
us to acknowledge not only the positive beauty of the natural world, 
but also the wisdom, perfection and beauty of the creator and of the 
individual  perceivers  of  this  beauty.  As  he  remarked  to  Sophie 
Charlotte,  the  more  we  uncover  the  order  and  harmony  in  the 
natural world, the more we are convinced that
the universe is  governed by a sovereign intelligence,  in  an 
order so perfect that, if one understood it in detail, one would 
not only believe but would even see that nothing better could 
be wished for. (Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte, 9/19 May 1697: GP 
VII 545; LTS 160).15
The natural sciences tell us how things work, but not why they work 
as they do. Laws and regularities are discovered, but the sciences 
do not and cannot explain why these ones obtain rather than others. 
The sciences reveal that the world is intelligible, but do not explain 
why it is intelligible. Nor indeed, can they offer any explanation as to 
why a world exists at all. In aesthetics, as the eighteenth century 
rationalist aestheticians had agreed, Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient 
Reason, rigorously applied, points to the need not only to declare 
15 Indeed, Leibniz even saw in the beauty of the world an argument – albeit not a 
demonstrative one – for the existence of God, for he writes that ‘from the beauty 
of things alone it is indeed very probable that the world was constructed by a 
most wise architect’, that is, God (On freedom, fate and God’s grace: A VI iv 1604; 
LGR  262).  In  one  early  writing,  he  even  suggested  that  the  world’s  beauty 
afforded an ‘infinite probability,  or moral  certainty’  that a mind – God’s – was 
behind it (Sketch of Catholic Demonstrations: A VI i 494; LGR 22).
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that  we  find  certain  things  beautiful,  but  also  to  justify  the 
attribution  by  giving  the  reasons  upon  which  the  judgement  is 
founded. In the natural sciences, the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
grounds the belief  that all  phenomena are explicable  in terms of 
efficient  causation,  but  it  also  shows  up  the  limitations  of  such 
explanations  and  highlights  the  need  to  postulate  an  ultimate 
reason that lies beyond the range of the empirical sciences. Such an 
ultimate  reason  appeals  to  the  considerations  of  goodness  and 
perfection  that  entered  into  God’s  decision  to  create  the  best 
possible  world.  In  this,  it  prioritises  final  causation  over  efficient 
causation: the laws of efficient causation that govern the collisions 
among bodies must, in the end, be explained by final causation’s 
reference to the divine will to create that possible world that God 
understood to be the best (Principles of Nature and Grace, §§ 8-11: 
GP VI 6-2-603; AG 210-211).16 
We must not distrust the pleasures that arise from intelligence 
or reasons, when we penetrate the reason of the reason of 
perfections, that is to say, when we see them follow from their 
source, which is the absolutely perfect being. 
The  perfect  being  is  called  God.  He  is  the  final  reason  of 
things, and the cause of causes. Being the sovereign wisdom 
and  sovereign  power,  he  has  always  chosen  the  best  and 
always acts in an orderly way (Happiness: Gr 580; SLT 168)
The natural sciences provide us in the first instance with knowledge 
of the beauty of nature, but in doing so they also expose their own 
limitations.  God is  needed as the ultimate reason why the world 
exists and the reason why the best possible world exists. God chose 
to create this world rather than any other because he knew that this 
16 ‘[T]he laws of motion cannot be explained through purely geometric principles 
or by imagination alone . . . they originate in the wisdom of their Author or in the 
principle  of  greatest  perfection,  which  has  led  to  their  choice.’  (Tentamen 
Anagogicum: GP VII 271-272; L 478).
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world fulfilled the criteria of goodness, harmony, order, beauty and 
perfection,  these  being  attributes  that  this  world  possesses 
objectively, i.e. in itself. We thus see that the Leibnizian theological 
justification of  positive aesthetics works together with a scientific 
justification.  First,  examples  of  the  beauty  and  perfection  of  the 
world are discovered by the natural sciences, but these in turn need 
to be explained by reference to decision of a perfect and rational 
God to create the best possible world,  which in turn justifies the 
positive aesthetical claim about the whole of nature, including those 
parts  that  have  not  yet  been  uncovered  through  scientific 
investigation,  and  consequently  of  whose  beauty  we  do  not  at 
present ‘have the right point of view to judge’ (to André Morell, 29 
September 1698: A I xvi 162; SLT 197).
It is a bit like in astronomy, where the motion of the planets 
appears to be a pure confusion when one looks at it from the 
Earth, but if we were in the sun we would find before our very 
eyes  this  beautiful  arrangement  of  the  system  which 
Copernicus  has  discovered  by  dint  of  reasoning.  As  the 
smallest  bodies  are,  so  to  speak,  small  worlds  full  of 
marvellous creatures,  we should not imagine that there are 
barren  parts,  absolutely  speaking,  even  though  they  seem 
barren to us. (ibid.)
Indeed, as Leibniz here hints with his reference to the absence of 
‘barren parts’ of nature, the perfection and beauty of God’s creation 
extends  far  beyond  that  which  can  ever  be  made  known  to  us 
through  the  empirical  sciences  alone.  The  sciences  have  made 
incredible  advances  in  uncovering  the  wealth  of  variety  and 
mechanical  ordering  among  bodies.  As  such,  however,  they  are 
concerned only with the physical aspects of living beings, including 
those  ‘marvellous  creatures’  in  the  seemingly  ‘barren  parts’  of 
nature  to  which  Leibniz  referred  Morell.  The  physical  sciences 
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struggle  to  describe  and  explain  the  psychical  aspects  of  these 
creatures:  the  inner,  subjective  experiences  had  by  the  monadic 
minds, souls or entelechies that Leibniz believed dominate and unify 
their organic bodies.17 In addition to the beautiful order and variety 
found in bodies, there is a beautiful order and variety to be found in 
minds,  souls  and  entelechies  whose  perceptions  ‘cannot  be 
explained mechanically’  (Monadology §17:  GP VI  609:  M 17),  but 
which  instead  must  be  explained  in  terms  of  the  same kinds  of 
reasons or final causes that inclined – but did not necessitate – God 
to  create  this  world  instead of  any of  the other  possible  worlds, 
namely the will, desire or appetite towards what is (or what appears 
to be) the best. (On the Ultimate Origination of Things: GP VII 302: 
AG 150. See also New Essays: A VI vi 178-179; RB 178-179).
The best possible world
Leibniz’s vision of the best possible world describes a harmonious 
plenum of living beings, of perceiving souls or entelechies and their 
organic  bodies,  which  bodies  are  themselves  composed  of  other 
monads  with  organic  bodies,  ad  infinitum.  Underpinning  the 
phenomenal  world  of  physical  nature  is  a  metaphysical  world  of 
monadic  unities.  The  opening  sections  of  Leibniz’s  Monadology 
demonstrate  the  logical  necessity  of  the  indivisible,  unified  and 
unifying monads as the foundational requisites of the physical world 
of divided aggregate bodies: 
1.  The monad,  about which we shall  speak here, is nothing 
other than a simple substance which enters into compounds, – 
‘simple’  meaning  ‘without  parts’.  (Theodicy,  preliminary 
discourse §10).
17 According to Leibniz,  bodies are either corporeal substances, that is, living 
bodies  endowed  with  dominant  minds,  souls  or  entelechies  or  aggregates  of 
corporeal substances (to Bierling, 12 August 1711: GP VII 501).
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2. And there must be simple substances, because there are 
compounds; for the compound is nothing but an accumulation 
or aggregate of simples. 
3. Now where there are no parts, neither extension, nor shape, 
nor  divisibility  is  possible.  And  these  monads  are  the  true 
atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things. 
(Monadology §§ 1-3: GP VI 607; M 14)
No created monad is ever separated from its organic body. Each is 
dominant over a constantly changing aggregate of substances (and 
aggregate of  subordinate monads with their  own organic bodies), 
forming with them an animal-like, living unity, a corporeal substance 
(Phemister 2005: chapters 1-3). Perceiving as a unified whole the 
effects of other substances on its own body, each monad constitutes 
a unique perspective on the world.18 Through the organs of its own 
body, every monadic soul perceives the entire world from its own 
‘point of view’, reflecting like a mirror the harmoniously ordered and 
varied whole: ‘souls in general are living mirrors or images of the 
universe  of  created  things’  (Monadology §83:  GP  VI  621;  M  31). 
Every monad is thus a unique representation of the infinitely varied 
multiplicity of monads with bodies (i.e. living creatures) that make 
up this world. 
Crucially,  this  means  that  every  monad is  itself  a  thing  of  great 
beauty. Every monad is a  ‘unity-in–variety’ and each of its passing 
perceptions is also a ‘unity-in-variety’, being a unified representation 
– from its own unique point of view – of  the current state of the 
18 Each monadic soul or entelechy perceives the effects of the external world on 
each of its body’s parts, holding the entire causal sequence leading up to present 
states of  each part  in  a  single  indivisible  perception and making possible  the 
corporeal substance’s role as itself a cause of future effects on others (Phemister 
2015: 137-140).
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whole of  this beautifully varied and perfectly ordered harmonious 
universe.  As  Leibniz  conceives  the  matter,  when  we  perceive 
perfections,  the  images  of  those  perfections  in  our  minds  are 
repetitions  of  the  perfections  present  in  what  is  perceived  and 
thereby serve to perfect the mind itself. In a discussion of pleasure 
in On Wisdom, he explains 
Pleasure is  the  feeling  of  a  perfection  or  an  excellence, 
whether in ourselves or in something else. For the perfection 
of  other  beings  is  also  agreeable,  such  as  understanding, 
courage, and especially beauty in another human beings, or in 
an animal or even in a lifeless creation, a painting or a work of 
craftsmanship,  as  well.  For  the image of  such perfection  in 
others, impressed upon us, causes some of this perfection to 
be implanted and aroused within ourselves. (On Wisdom: GP 
VII 86; L 425)
Leibniz’s claim here that only ‘some of the perfection’ perceived is 
implanted  in  the  perceiver  should  not  be  read  as  endorsing  the 
notion  that  some  monads  do  not  perceive  the  whole  universe. 
Leibniz is  clear that monads always perceive the perfect whole.19 
Rather, the degree of perfection in the perceiver is proportional to 
the degree of distinctness of the monad’s perceptions. Given that a 
monad’s internal qualities are its perceptions and appetitions (the 
forces that move the monad from one perception onto the next in 
the sequence), and given that the perceptions can only be described 
in terms of their representational content together with the degree 
of confusion or distinctness of the representation, within the context 
of  Leibniz’s  philosophical  system,  it  makes  sense  to  regard 
representations of external perfections as internal perfections of the 
mind, with the amount of the perfection ‘implanted and aroused’ in 
19 The general  order  of  the  universe  demands  that  this  be  so  (Principles  of 
Nature and Grace, §§ 12-13: GP VI 603-604; M 275). 
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this way dependent upon how distinctly the external perfection is 
perceived. Consequently, although all monads are beautiful insofar 
as their  perceptions  echo internally  the full  range of  variety  and 
order of the external world, they are not all beautiful to the same 
degree, for the more distinctly the external perfection is perceived, 
the more perfect and beautiful is the perceiver. 
Such  qualitative  differences  in  the  degrees  of  perceptual 
distinctness give each monad its unique perspective on the world. 
This in turn allows each to make its own distinctive contribution to 
the  harmonious  variety  and  order  of  the  world  as  a  whole.  The 
magnificent beauty of the world itself is manifested in the infinity of 
distinct and unique individuals as well  as the order and harmony 
that comes from the fact that their  perceptions all  represent the 
same world, a world in which each finite individual mirrors not only 
the world, but also its Divine Creator:20
every substance is like a complete world and like a mirror of 
God or of the whole universe, which each one expresses in its 
own way, somewhat as the same city is variously represented 
depending  upon  the  different  positions  from  which  it  is 
viewed. Thus the universe is in some way multiplied as many 
times as there are substances, and the glory of God is likewise 
multiplied by as many entirely different representations of his 
work.
(Discourse on Metaphysics, §9: GP IV 434; AG 42)
20 The Leibnizian universe actually contains multiple harmonic orders: of bodies, 
of perceiving monads, and of souls and bodies united. Described more abstractly, 
these harmonies are systems of efficient causes and of final causes operating in 
parallel, each so finely tuned that, whatever is happening in the one corresponds 
exactly  to  what  is  happening  in  the  other,  in  the  manner  of  a  mathematical 
bijective function. A further harmonic ordering, which perhaps need not concern 
us here, is the harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace, where the 
kingdom of grace is the moral kingdom of God comprising all rational minds and 
spirits. For further details, see Phemister 2003 and Strickland 2016.
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Variations in the degrees of perfection are essential if monads are to 
be distinguished both from each other and from God. On the other 
hand, of course,  this means that all  finite created beings contain 
some  imperfections.  Whether  these  imperfections  are  mere 
absences of  perfection or  actual  imperfections,  it  is  clear  that  in 
mirroring  each  other,  each  monad  must  represent  not  only  the 
others’ perfections, but also their imperfections. Just as the images 
of  the  perfections  of  others  are  ‘implanted  and  aroused’  in  the 
perceivers, so too must be the images of others’ imperfections and 
the  question  must  be  asked:  Do  these  imperfections  and  their 
images pose a threat to the idea that Leibniz advances a positive 
aesthetics in respect of the natural world?
 
Superficially, this might appear to be the case, but Leibniz himself 
argues that any imperfections, taken in the context of the whole, 
benefit rather than detract from the beauty of the world. Obviously 
some  imperfections  are  required  in  order  to  increase  nature’s 
variety and, in the case of less than fully distinct perceptions, these 
can be accommodated without any diminution of the order among 
things:  order  is  retained  because  all  monads  perceive  the  same 
world in its  entirety;  maximum variety is  introduced because the 
differing degrees of distinctness of monads’ perceptions ensure that 
the world is perceived from all possible perspectives. In this way, 
therefore,  what  appears  in  a  limited  context  an  imperfection  is, 
when considered in its wider context, a valued part of the whole. By 
way of illustration, Leibniz draws upon the visual and aural arts: 
Look at a very beautiful picture, and cover up except for some 
small  part.  What  will  it  look  like  but  some  confused 
combination of colors, without delight, without art; indeed the 
more we examine it the more it will look that way. But as soon 
as the covering is removed, and you see the whole surface 
from  an  appropriate  place,  you  will  understand  that  what 
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looked like accidental splotches on the canvas were made with 
consummate skill by the creator of the work. What the eyes 
discover in the painting, the ears discover in music. Indeed, 
the most distinguished masters of composition quite often mix 
dissonances with consonances in order to arouse the listener, 
and pierce him, as it were, so that, anxious about what is to 
happen, the listener might  feel  all  the more pleasure when 
order is soon restored. (On the Ultimate Origination of Things: 
GP VII 306; AG 153)21 
All  created  monads,  insofar  as  they  possess  varying  degrees  of 
power, of knowledge or perception, and appetites or drive towards 
the  good,  are  created  in  the  image  of  a  God  conceived  as 
omnipotent,  omniscient  and  universally  benevolent  (Phemister 
2016: chapter 6). Leibniz’s God is a fully rational God and in this 
respect, rational minds and spirits bear the closest resemblance to 
their Creator. The principles of reason are the same in God as they 
are in finite minds. The intelligible order and harmony that pleases 
God is the same order and harmony by which the world becomes 
intelligible to finite minds and that is pleasing to them when they 
contemplate it. In short, the principles of reason that govern human 
thought are believed by the Leibnizian theist to be exactly the same 
rational principles that characterise God’s omniscience. 
It is thus through theological belief in the existence of a rational and 
good God that we can be convinced that the order and harmony the 
natural sciences find in our multi-faceted world are not illusory, but 
that the world itself in all its parts is in principle intelligible. In the 
absence of  a  theological  belief  in  divine  rationality,  the  sciences 
cannot guarantee that the world itself conforms throughout to our 
intelligible  reconstruction  of  it.  Nor  can  they  guarantee  that  our 
rational understanding of the world is an accurate representation of 
21 See also Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte, 9/19 May 1697: GP VII 545; LTS 160.
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the world as it really is in itself. The natural sciences on their own 
cannot provide a sure guarantee that the principles of harmony and 
order  that  signal  intelligibility  to  the  human mind  are  applicable 
throughout all nature. The natural sciences have not, and perhaps 
never  will,  achieve complete  understanding  of  the  natural  world. 
The major part remains hidden from view. Without the theological 
grounding jettisoned by Carlson,  it  remains a real  possibility  that 
natural scientific explanations indicate more about the nature of the 
human mind and its  need to  find  order  and harmony in  what  is 
essentially a chaotic system than it does about the actual nature of 
the  world  itself.  For  Leibniz’s  rational  theist,  however,  the 
intelligibility of scientific explanation is justified by the theological 
belief  in  the  rationality  and  intelligibility  of  the  creator.  To  the 
Leibnizian  believer,  the  order  and  harmony  already  discovered 
through  the  sciences  is  representative  of  a  beautiful  order  and 
harmony throughout a world freely chosen by a rational God who 
finds  goodness,  perfection  and  intelligible  beauty  in  the 
maximisation of variety within unifying orderliness. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued for a reading of Leibniz’s aesthetics as 
an early example of a positive aesthetics of nature. In satisfying this 
modest  aim we have also tried to show that Leibniz’s  version of 
positive aesthetics is plausible, not just in itself  but also vis-a-vis 
modern versions of the doctrine, in particular that developed and 
endorsed by Allen Carlson. We have noted already Malcolm Budd’s 
concern that the doctrine of positive aesthetics is often vague or 
imprecise, inasmuch as formulations of the doctrine typically leave 
it unclear whether it applies to nature as whole, or the biosphere, 
ecosystems,  species,  individual  (natural)  things,  or  individual 
(natural) events (Budd 2002: 97). As we have already shown, while 
the  charge  of  vagueness  or  imprecision  does  apply  to  Carlson’s 
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version of the doctrine, it does not to Leibniz’s; for whereas Carlson 
is not clear as to what exactly he thinks the doctrine applies, Leibniz 
explicitly tells us that the whole is beautiful, as is each and every 
component  of  that  whole,  that  is,  each  monad together  with  its 
organic body, as well as every aggregate body composed of these. 
In this way, Leibniz’s  positive aesthetics is  all-encompassing,  and 
this too makes it more attractive than Carlson’s: for when faced with 
the objection that the natural world contains instances of ugliness, 
e.g. in malformed living things, Carlson swiftly concedes the point, 
thus  making  his  version  of  positive  aesthetics  limited  in  scope. 
Leibniz’s version, meanwhile, recognizes no exceptions whatsoever; 
he tells us that if we think we have found an example of natural 
ugliness or disorder, it is because we are not considering it aright. 
Thus to two of the most common objections to positive aesthetics, 
Leibniz’s version of the doctrine offers the more satisfying response. 
Leibniz’s version of positive aesthetics has a further advantage over 
Carlson’s on account of its justification. While Leibniz, like Carlson, 
offered a justification of the doctrine based on the natural sciences, 
Leibniz realised that this alone was not sufficient.  He saw that it 
needs  to  be  supplemented  by  a  rational  theology  that  validates 
scientific method and that also brings into focus the contributions of 
the monads to the overall beauty of the created world. To be fair, a 
theological justification alone is also not sufficient. Although in this 
paper we have highlighted the deficiencies of the sciences in this 
regard, it is equally the case that without the natural sciences, we 
would be ignorant of the ‘wonders of nature’ that, for Leibniz, not 
only evidence the beauty of nature, but point further to the beauty 
of their creator and that underpin the beauty of all who perceive 
them. Together, however, the natural  sciences and theology offer 
the strongest justification of a positive aesthetics of nature.
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